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INTRODUCTION

How do participants in American constitutional-legal argument envision - whether tacitly or elaborately - the character and point of
political activity in the conditions of contemporary American representative democracy? This essay pursues that question using as primary
source materials the opinions of United States Supreme Court Justices

*Professor of Law, Harvard. This article was delivered as the Dunwody Lecture at the
University of Florida College of Law, on March 9, 1989.
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in constitutional voting rights cases.1 I focus on cases of claimed infringements of franchise rights by laws restricting electorates to some
subset, such as property owners or area residents, of all those who

might imaginably take an interest in a given election.2 My inquiry
proceeds from a thesis concerning the inspirations of legal argument
and judicial explanation, especially in fields such as constitutional law
in which issues soaked with political interest are salient and focal.
That initial premise - certainly not original here 3 - is that legal
argument and judicial explanation in such fields unselfconsciously re-

flect underlying assumptions about actual and potential social relations,
and about the institutional arrangements and forms of political life fit

for those relations as they are and are capable of becoming. If at one
level the judicial opinion is a ratiocination on deliberate social ordering
by law, at another level it may record a certain, social common sense
regarding people's capacities for leading good lives together, a sense
that is common to the judicial author's own era, culture, and professional circle. I am interested in bringing to light some characteristic

tensions in the normative conceptions of democratic politics latent in
the legal arguments prompted by the cases in my sample.
II.

AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

As a way of framing the tensions, we can try to fit our survey of
1. This inquiry belongs to a larger study I have in progress of the ways in which American
constitutional lawyers, judges, and academic commentators, in our everyday practice of argument
and explanation, actually (if often only tacitly) conceive of the supposedly sovereign people and
their democratic processes. See Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of PornographyRegulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1989) (hereinafter Michelman, Pornography];Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter
Michelman, Law's Republic]; see also Michelman, PoliticalMarkets and Community Self-Determination: CompetingJudicialModels of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977).
At what moments in our arguments and explanations do we make - or perhaps signally omit
to make - justificatory references to popular determinations respecting the laws? How are we,
at those moments, conceiving of the people and their politics, both empirically and normatively?
In these conceptions, or our argumentative deployments of them, are there inconsistencies or
irregularities that need trouble us? Are there divisions among us, patterns of difference in
conception and deployment that, if brought to light, would clarify basic issues of constitutionalism
or enable advocates to argue more persuasively? those are among the questions I have in mind.
For further discussion of the aims of this investigation, see infra part V.
2. In the sequel or sequels, I plan to extend the analytic framework developed here to
cases involving disputes over representation schemes. These include districting and apportionment; "dilution" of voting power through gerrymanders and multi-member (at-large) slates; and
claims to proportional representation. I also plan to extend the analytic framework to disputes
over selective use of direct-democratic procedures for legislation.
3. See, e.g., Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752-54
(1988); R. Parker, Political Vision in Constitutional Argument (Feb. 1979 draft) (unpublished
manuscript) (quoted in H. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION 205-06 (1987)).
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judicial imaginings of American politics into a broader contemporary
discussion about the normative underpinnings of American constitutionalism. Historians, political theorists, and - belatedly, as usual
constitutional law scholars have for some years been mooting the
question whether the American Constitution, along with the surrounding body of constitutional-legal doctrine expounded in its name, belongs
strictly to that great tradition in the modern history of political thought
we know as liberalism or partakes also of a competing, if more ancient,
so-called republican tradition. 4 Obviously, "republican" here does not
stand for people who in American electoral politics contest elections
against Democrats, any more than "liberal" stands for the L-word as in "bleeding-heart liberal," or "pointy-headed liberal." Perhaps with
some broad strokes I can convey a working sense of the "liberal"/"republican" opposition that the scholars have had in mind, cast in terms
useful for sorting out the particular source materials under examination
in this essay. With that purpose in view, one might consider differentiating the two positions according to their respective stances regarding any or all of (i) the social bases of human interests or goods and
the origins or grounds of legal rights, (ii) the motivational character
or ethos (actual or ideal) of political activity, and (iii) the value or
point of a person's engagement in such activity.
A.

Conceptions of Interests and Rights

In an interest-centered account the essential difference between
republican and liberal constitutional-legal thought is that republicanism
affirms, while liberalism denies, the notion of a statewide, substantive
common interest or good. Accordingly, the special mark of republican
constitutional thought is affirmation of "an autonomous public interest
independent of the sum of individual interests," 5 a common interest
existent and determinable not just within the confines of a particular
social group (as workers may be said to have a common interest vis-Avis employers and consumers, or a religious community may be said
to have a common interest vis-4-vis secular society) but at the encompassing level of the sovereign or law-making state. In this view, repub6
lican social unitarism or solidarism stands opposed to liberal pluralism.
4. See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 1, at 1494-95 nn.3-5.
5. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalismin American ConstitutionalThought, 29 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 57, 67 (1987); cf. M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
173-74, 183 (1982) (contrasting "liberalism" with a "constitutive conception of community").
6. Some normative political theories may be described as asserting a statewide, common

interest in maintaining certain process-related conditions of political justice and utility for all,
while denying any common interest in preferred resolutions of substantive conflicts of interests
and values. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
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According to a rights-centered construction of the liberal/republican
opposition,7 the crux of difference lies in the question not of the social
basis of interests but of the political basis of rights. For republicans,
rights ultimately are nothing but determinations of prevailing political
will, while for liberals, some rights are always grounded in a "higher
law" of transpolitical reason or revelation. For republicans, the establishment and endurance of a constitutional right is strictly a matter
of resolution on the part of the people politically engaged; the right
has no grounding beyond actual human determination and therefore
can exert no claims against the political resolutions that alone give it
existence. In the opposed liberal understanding, the constitutional
process (for example) do not so much create rights as institutionalize
or '"positivize" prepolitical claims of right.*
The way in which the interest-centered and rights-centered constructions are usually fit together in a unified account of the liberal/republican opposition seems to be this: In a republican view, a community's objective, common good substantially consists in the success of
its political endeavor to define, establish, effectuate, and sustain the
set of rights (less tendentiously, laws) best suited to the conditions
and mores of that community.9 Whereas in a contrasting liberal view,

(1980). Such theories seemingly would count as liberal on the interest-centered account of the
republican/liberal distinction. See Sandel, The ProceduralRepublic and the Unencumbered Self,
12 POL. THEORY 81 (1984). But here, as usual, the line between process and product (procedure
and substance) is unstable. Consider, for example, a theory that (i) holds that no political system
can possibly claim to embody, or hope to deliver, justice and utility for all (or perhaps for any)
if it tolerates social conditions of group- or class-based oppression or excessive inequalities of
wealth and other forms of social power; and (ii) therefore always strives to keep the avoidance
of oppression and maldistribution at the head of the political agenda. See generally Young, Five
Faces of Oppression, 19 PHIL. FORUm 270 (1988) (providing a relevant account of "oppression").
On which side of the substance/procedure line does such an asserted common interest fall?
The difficulty of answering such a question contributes to the difficulty of finally maintaining
Edwin Baker's proposed distinction between "liberal republicanism" and "republican liberalism."
See Baker, Republican Liberalism:Liberal Rights and Republican Politics, 41 FLA. L. REV.
491 (1989) [hereinafter Baker, Republican Liberalism]. For other factors contributing to this
difficulty, see infra notes 10, 57.
7. See, e.g., Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional Property, in 3
ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOORROW (E. Paul
ed. 1989) [hereinafter Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence].
8. See Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE
L.J. 449, 478, 480-81, 483, 486 (1989). Insomuch as a constitutional right is a legal right, legal
positivists (meaning the huge preponderance of contemporary American thinkers about law)
must find for every such right some mediate basis in the politically enacted Constitution, rather
than derive it directly from moral-theoretical reason or natural law.
9. See, e.g., Mlichelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence, supra note 7.
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the higher-law rights provide the transactional structures and the
curbs on power required so that pluralistic pursuit of diverse and
conflicting interests may proceed as satisfactorily as possible. 10
B. Conceptions of Political Ethos
1. Deliberative vs. Strategic Interaction
Consider, now, a process-centered account of the liberal/republican
opposition, turning on a distinction between deliberative and strategic
politics., Deliberative politics connotes an argumentative interchange
among persons who recognize each other as equal in authority and
entitlement to respect. The participants direct their arguments toward
arriving at a reasonable answer to some question of public ordering,
meaning an answer that all can accept as a good-faith resolution when
circumstances demand some social choice. A deliberative style of

10. See, e.g., Mlichelman, Law's Republic, upra note 1, at 1507-08, 1510-11.
Again, however, our working categorial distinction - this time that between "politics" and
"higher law" - proves unstable when hard pressed. On the one hand, dialogically inclined
liberalism dilutes the notion of higher law into that of practice justifiable by reasons that can
count as "good" from "a public moral standpoint." See, e.g., Macedo, Liberal Virtues, Constitutionual Community, 50 REV. OF POLITICS 215, 220-23 (1988). On the other hand, republican
theory is not so stupid as to hold that 'the people" acting "politically" can hope or claim to
fashion "suitable" laws regardless of the institutional structures (including the rules of enfranchisement) framing their politics and the social conditions surrounding and motivating those
politics. See, e.g., Mlichelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Govera ,nent, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43-47 (1986) [hereinafter Micheman, Traces] (discussing James
Harrington's institutional prescriptions). For example, a basic republican tenet holds that the
social distribution of wealth is "prior to politics" and "necessarily foundational to politics considered as a moral enterprise." Mensch & Freeman, A RepublicanAgendaforHobbesianAmerica?,
41 FLA. L. REV. 581 (1989) [hereinafter Mensch & Freeman, HobbesianAmerica); see Horwitz,
supra note 5, at 71-72; Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 1, at 1504-05; Michelman, Possession vs. Distributionin the ConstitutionalIdea of Property,72 IOwA L. REV. 1319, 1320-21,
1324, 1329, 1334-36, 134345, 1349-50 (1987) [hereinafter Michelman, Possessionvs. Distribution];
Michelman, Traces, supra at 40-41. The posited institutional and social conditions of good or
reliable politics have a status in republican constitutional thought that is hard to distinguish
from that of higher law, even as republicans hold (circularly) that only politics does or can
create and validate the laws on which the conditions of good politics depend. See Michelman,
Law's Republic, supra note 1, at 1504-05; Micheman, Traces, supra, at 48. This ambiguity is
a second factor (for the first factor, see supra note 6) which, as Baker recognizes, tends to
break down the distinction between "liberal republicanism" and "republican liberalism." See
Baker, Republican Liberalism, supra note 6, at 491.
11. By offering these as opposed models, I do not mean to deny the possibility of social
interaction in which deliberative and strategic elements are combined, or which otherwise
mediate between the two models. See Mlicheliman, Law's Republic, supra note 1, at 1510-13.
12. See Barber, The Politics of Judgment, 5:2 RARITAN 130 (1985).
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politics may be confrontational, contestative, and fully compatible with
pluralistic political sociology. It is true that notions of deliberative
politics may be framed as presupposing the existence of objectively
discoverable, transcendently right or best answers, or as demanding

of participants the submergence of their individualities and conflicts
in a collective being or common good. But aspirations to deliberative

politics need not carry such strongly solidaristic baggage. 13 Deliberation does presuppose a certain kind of civic friendship, an attitude of
openness to persuasion by reasons referring to the claims and perspec-

tives of others. The deliberative attitude aims not at dissolution of
difference but at conciliation within reason. The deliberative medium

is a good-faith exchange of views

-

including participants' reports of

their own understandings of their respective vital interests - in which
14
all remain open to the possibility of persuasion by others.

Strategic interaction, by contrast, seeks coordination rather than

cooperation. Ultimately it asks each person to consider no one's interest but her or his own. Its medium is not argument but bargain.
Its tools of persuasion are not claims and reasons but conditional offers
15
of service and forbearance.
2. Deliberative Politics and Liberalism

Given my writings of recent years, 16 a reader might suspect that
the opposition between "deliberative" and "strategic" politics will serve

here as just another variation on the thematic opposition of "republican" versus "liberal" constitutional visions. Intuitively, the idea would be
to yoke republican political pursuit of rights expressive of the common

good with deliberative politics while yoking liberal political accommodation of pluralistic diversity of self-interested pursuits to strategic

13. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. Nor need they even presuppose the
possibility of '"articipants discover[ing] in the residue" of their contestation any substantive
value or policy preference that "they share in common" (other than maintaining the social
conditions prerequisite to "politics considered as a moral enterprise") or of their forging any
"common actuality" (beyond their common engagement in the deliberative political process itself).
Barber, supra note 12, at 136, 140-41. The parenthetical qualifications may, however, be momentous. See supra note 6.
14. For a comparable conception of deliberative politics, see Young, Polity and Group
Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 256-63 (1989).
15. Strategic conceptions of political process are asserted or presupposed, and their consequences analyzed, by the interest group pluralist and public-choice schools of modem political
science. For a handy example, see Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA. L. REV.
563 (1989) [hereinafter Alexander, PoliticalThicket].
16. See Michelman, Pornography, supra note 1; Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note
1; Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution, supra note 10; Michelman, Traces, supra note 10.
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politics framed and bounded by17higher-law rules. That idea, however,
is more facile than interesting.
Neither the interest-centered' s nor the rights-centered 9 construction of the liberal/republican opposition warrants excluding deliberative politics from liberal constitutionalism because on neither construction do we confront in "liberalism" a political vision bereft of normative
content or justificatory claim. Versions of liberal constitutionalism tend
to posit analogues of the republican notion of common good; they tend
to posit "common goods" in some extenuated, perhaps procedural
sense. 20 On the interest-centered construction, the extenuated-sense,
liberal common good might consist just in the "sum" of the individual
interests; that is, it might consist in maximizing the total system of
the satisfactions of such interests. 21 On the rights-centered construction, liberalism may posit, as an obvious cognate of the republican
common good, the vindication of the higher-law rights (or of the optimal system of such rights) of individuals.- Thus, insofar as liberal
political culture does valorize strategic political action, it may do so
on the understanding that such action is conducive to optimization
across individual interests, or across individual rights, or across some
combination thereof. A liberalism thus normatively fortified, noticing
that men and women are not angels, 2 may conclude that the best hope
for optimization lies in letting people engage in strategic political interaction, even to the point of contesting over a certain range of
governmental spoils, as long as they do so abiding by well-crafted
procedural rules and firm substantive limits.24 But it also might consis-

17. For invaluable help in clarifying my thoughts about this matter, I am beholden to the
civic friendship of combative students in a 1988 Constitutional Theory class who refused to take
evasions for answers. If they read this, they'll know who they are.
18. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
19. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
20. See, for example, the discussion in note 6, supra.
21. More precisely expressed, the extenuated-sense "common good" would consist in the
optimization of a system of individual satisfactions constituted by the aggregation rules and
distributional constraints of some want-regarding "social welfare function." The rules and constraints might correspond to anyone of various normative aims: total-utilitarian, average utilitarian, leveller-egalitarian, Rawlsian maximinitarian, or any other down to and including the bare
Hobbesian preference for any regime that offers effective protection against slaughter, rapine,
and pillage over any that does not. See B. BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 38-39 (1965); J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 150-92 (1971).
22. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 203, 229-30.
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J.Madison).
24. Such a conclusion might reflect an empirical judgment that effective suppression of
strategic politics and political spoliation cannot come about without grievous violations of people's
rights. Or an underlying judgment might be that such suppression would cause explosive pressure
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tently, and perhaps more plausibly, encourage a more cooperative
political style of good-faith deliberation toward that same, optimizing
objective. Why not, since who can be so omnisciently pessimistic as
to know that discursive miracles never happen?
In sum, we cannot convincingly distinguish liberal constitutionalism
from a republican counterpart by setting the former in deep, conceptual opposition to deliberative conceptions of communicative action.
Trenchant distinctions, if any, between liberal and republican conceptions of political engagement must lie elsewhere.
C.

Conceptions of the Point of Participationin Politics
1. Dialogic Politics

According to a certain normative conception - call it the "dialogic
conception" - of the self in society, a person's identity is partially
constituted by that person's social situation, and personal freedom
accordingly depends on a capacity for self-critical reconsideration of
the socially embedded ends and commitments that partly make one
who one is.2 Dialogic, ethical encounter with others with whom one
must share some understandings about the ordering and direction of
social life, but who by reason of experience and inspiration bring to
the encounter perspectives on human interests and needs different
from one's own, would be a medium - perhaps an indispensable one
of personal freedom according to the dialogic conception.2s A deliberative political process would be such a medium, assuming that
participants did not try at all costs to protect their prepolitical understandings of interests and ends against the possibility of change in
political conflict or debate and could embrace such changes as exercises
of freedom rather than as impairments of integrity.2 Such an attitude
of openness to ethical evolution through political engagement is the
dialogic attitude. The subset of deliberative politics imbued with that
attitude is dialogic politics.

against all constitutional limits, leaving no dependable barriers against descent into the Hobbesian maelstrom. See J. BUCHANAN, THE LimiTs OF LIBERTY 24-26 (1975).

25. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, supra note 5, at 172-73 (rejecting "direct self-knowledge" in
favor of "growth and transformation in light of revised self-understanding"); W. SULLIVAN,
RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 39 (paper ed. 1986) ("Modern individualism is itself
a collective achievement."); cf. P. RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HuAMAN SCIENCES

143-44, 158-59 (J. Thompson ed. 1981) ("As reader, I find myself only... by losing myself.").
26. See, e.g., R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 80 (1989); Michelman,
Law's Republic, supra note 1, at 1528 and nn.141-44.
27. See W. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 153-55 (2d ed. 1983).
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As a normative conception, dialogic politics can accommodate either
solidaristic commitment or pluralistic resistance to the idea of an objectively discoverable, substantive common good. In a solidaristic
view, the aim of political dialogue is political truth, discovery issuing
in consensus.2 In a pluralistic view, dialogue is a medium of personal
moral freedom.2 To that extent, the dialogic ideal is available as either
"republican" or "liberal" doctrine. 30 Yet the dialogic attitude of receptivity to ethical persuasion through political engagement seems closely
allied with a distinctively republican conception of laws and rights as
always and unreservedly open to political reconsideration.31 In that
limited sense, pursuit of dialogic politics might be regarded as the
form of republicanism suitable to a pluralistic political sociology.A2
2. Franchise Values: Instrumental or Constitutive
A person may value enfranchisement in political affairs - a voice
backed by a vote - for either of two types of reasons distinguishable
as "instrumental" and "constitutive." Political participation is valued
instrumentally as a means to defend or further interests formed and
defined outside of politics. In a strictly instrumental valuation of political participation, the experience of the participation itself neither
contains any positive value nor affects the content of anyone's or any
group's interests and ends.
By contrast, in a constitutive understanding, the point of engagement in politics lies not in any ulterior end but in the ends-affecting
- the dialogic - experience of the engagement itself. That experience
is valued as a process of formation or field of exertion of self or
community. Through political engagement, persons or communities (or
both, reciprocally) forge identities, and persons assume freedom in
m The value of the
the "positive" sense of social and moral agency.s
engagement is thus understood as inseparable from the self-constitutive values of identity and freedom.
Just as with the opposition of deliberative and strategic political
milieux, the instrumental/constitutive axis assumes no necessary,
block-form alignment with the other oppositions sometimes entering

28. See, e.g., J. MIANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 4-6, 24-25 (1983).
29. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 1, at 1526-28.
30. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
32. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 1, at 1503-07, 1526-28.
33. On the "positive" conception of liberty, see Mlichelman, Law's Republic, supra note 1,
at 1503-04 and nn.33-37; lichelman, Traces, supra note 10, at 25-26 and nn.115-22.
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into distinctions between liberal and republican constitutional visions.
For example, an instrumental conception of participation values can
cohabit comfortably with a deliberative conception of political process
on either a solidaristic or pluralistic view of interests and ends. In a
solidaristic view, the instrumental value of one's participation in political deliberation is one's potential contribution to the ascertainment
of political truth. 4 On a pluralistic view, anyone subject to the authority of a deliberative political processs' would obviously have good instrumental reasons for wanting that process to be fully accessible to
the direct influence of both her arguments and her preferences.
Similarly, a constitutive conception of participation values may conceivably accompany either a strategic or a deliberative conception of
political process. The constitutive/strategic pairing might arise from
a nomative conception of human personality in which the "game's the
thing," and in which, accordingly, engagement in strategic politics is
an important or essential medium of personal identity, agency, and
freedom. Because such a combination lacks salience in American normative constitutional vision, at least as manifested in the sample of
judicial argument examined below, it receives no further consideration
here.
By contrast, our sample of judicial material does show signs of a
constitutive conception of the point of political engagement consorting
with a deliberative ideal for political ethos, and we shall pursue the
implications of that combination. One should note preliminarily that
the constitutive/deliberative combination can accommodate either a
solidaristic-affirmative or a pluralistic-negative stance on the question
of an objectively discoverable, substantive common interest or good. 36
The solidaristic construction accords with proto-totalitarian readings
of Rousseau,37 whereby not only are political deliberations ideally directed toward the discernment and advancement of the community's
substantive common good, but persons attain freedom and self-fulfillment through the will to subordinate all particular and partisan ends
to this communitarian quest. The alternative, pluralistic construction
of the constitutive/deliberative combination accommodates the self-formation and self-liberation of persons whose identities are partially
constituted by social situation and whose freedoms depend on their
capacities for dialogic self-revision.m
34.

This point will become important later. See infranotes 74, 189-90 and accompanying text.

35. We have already established that pluralistic assumptions can support a preference for
a deliberative political ethos. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
36.
37.
to Say,
38.

See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Simon, The New Republicanism: Generosity of Spirit in Search of Something
29 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 83, 92 (1987).
See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
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III. HISTORICAL EXCURSUS: SOLIDARISTIC
REPUBLICANISM, CONSTITUTIVE DELIBERATION,
AND VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION
Thus neither concept nor circumstance compels any block alignment
of our several oppositional axes into stably coherent, diametric "liberal"
and "republican" constitutional-visionary formations. Historical contingency is, however, another matter. It may be that several such
block constructs have jelled temporarily in American constitutional-visionary history. It will serve our purposes to recollect one such past
constructive moment, as preserved in an 1845 case questioning slavery
in New Jersey. The exercise suggests how an otherwise puzzling judicial essay may be demystified by studying its author's tacit assumptions about the relations among human interests, rights, politics, and
39

"nature." More pointedly, in the explosive tension latent in this
momentary construction, and in the tracing of its remnants, may lie
a key to the sense and significance of some of the modern judicial
40
utterances examined below.
State v. Post4l was an 1845 New Jersey case in which abolitionist
lawyers unsuccessfully tried to obtain, by writ of habeas corpus, an
order releasing from Post's custody two persons, William and Flora,
held by Post as slaves.42 It was a test case designed, as the court
expressly understood, to "present for... adjudication the question,
whether slavery can exist [in]... this state under its present constitution .... ."4 From our vantage point, the question might have seemed
to answer itself. The relevant state constitutional text declared that
"[all men are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural
and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defend-

39. Cf. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 335 (1989) (explaining by a similar method how it could have made sense for 19th-century
American constitutionalists to reject freeholder and other wealth-based tests for enfranchisement
while retaining or substituting "pauper" exclusions).
40. See supra text accompanying note 3.
41. 20 N.J.L. 368 (1845). I focus here on the seriatim opinion of Justice Nevius. See id.
at 369-78. For an extended historical examination of this case, see Ernst, Legal Positivism,
Abolitionist Litigation, and the New Jersey Slave Case of 1845, 4 LAw & HIST. REV. 337
(1986). Ernst, quoting contemporary sources, relates that "Nevius, the second oldest man on
the bench, was not generally considered by the bar 'as having a very accurate knowledge of
the law,' and the bar did not 'place the fullest confidence in his decisions."' Id. at 356. Those
reports will not interfere with the use to which I put his opinion here.
42. Post, 20 N.J.L. at 368-69.
43. Id. at 369. The "present constitution" had been very recently adopted, in 1844. See id.
at 368.
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ing life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property,
and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."Taken at face value, this clause seems irreconcilable with the persistence of legally sanctioned slavery in New Jersey. However, Justice
Nevius, writing for the court, 45 denied its abolitionist import. In so
doing, he appealed to the intent of the framers. 46 At the time of the
recent New Jersey constitutional convention, slavery in New Jersey
was both a legally established institution (although economically unimportant) and one headed for extinction under a statutory scheme of
gradual emancipation. 47 Justice Nevius reasoned that if the framers
had contemplated immediate abolition - a sharp break with the established ordering - they surely would have spoken explicitly to that
effect and "not left so important and grave a question ... to depend
upon the doubtful construction of an indefinite abstract political proposition. ,48
But still, as the justice admitted, 4 9 texts and plain meanings come
first. How can one read what the framers wrote - "[a]ll men are by
nature free and independent, and have ... unalienable rights ... of
enjoying liberty . . ."5 - to leave any room for legally sanctioned
slavery? One might (perhaps recollecting subsequent constitutional
history51 ) speculate that the justice thought the framers could not have
understood "all men" to include the black petitioners before him.
Perhaps, if pressed, he would have so contended, but as it happened,
he took another way.

44.
45.

Id. at 372 (quoting N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. 1, § 1).
Justice Carpenter concurred with Justice Nevius. See id. at 386 (Carpenter, J., concur-

ring). Justice Randolph agreed in a separate opinion that the writ ought to be denied. See id.
at 378 (Randolph, J., concurring). Chief Justice Hornblower dissented. See id. at 386
(Hornblower, C.J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 378. Cf. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405, 407, 426 (1856)

(relying on the intent of the framers for the conclusion that "the class of person who had been
imported as slaves [and] their descendants" cannot be "citizens" within the meaning of that

term as used in the Constitution).
47. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
55-56 (1975); Ernst, supra note 41, at 339-40.
48. Post, 20 N.J.L. at 375. Colloquy recorded in the records of the New Jersey Constitutional

Convention provided legislative history upon which Justice Nevius might have rested a holding
that the framers had designed the "free and independent" clause as strictly preambular material
devoid of legally operative effect. See Ernst, supra note 41, at 362-63. However, as shown by

the excerpt from his opinion quoted in the text accompanying note 50, Nevius was not content
to rest his judgment on this ground alone without also explaining how the "free and independent"
clause could be reconciled with legally established slavery.
49. See id. at 373.
50. N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. 1, § 1.
51. See supra note 46. '
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Surprisingly, the "doubtful" locution turns out to be not "men" but
"free and independent." Slavery, it seemed, did not contravene the
freedom of the slave:
[I]n a state of. . . political society [freedom and independence].., must be understood in a modified sense according
to the nature, the condition and laws of the society to which
they belong ....
Authority and subordination are essential
under every form of civil society, and one of its leading
principles is that the citizen yields to it a portion of his
natural rights, for the better protection of the remainder.
In such a state, man's right to freedom and independence...
[is] ever subject to, and regulated by, laws fundamental or
otherwise, which the majority of the people in a republic,
have established for their government ....
[I]n a republican
government, those laws which define, limit and regulate the
exercise of ... natural rights[ ] may be esteemed as enacted
by the people themselves, and therefore ... the voluntary
assent of every individual is expressly or impliedly given to
them; and of consequence ... men exercise and enjoy these
rights, according to their own free will . . . . It was in
reference to [this] form of government . . . that . . . I
apprehend ... that this language [of freedom and independence] was used . . . . It is spoken of men in their social
state, and is nothing more than the expression of an opinion
of their political rights . . . . Had the convention intended
to ... divest the master of his right of property in his slave
and the slave of his right to protection and support from the
master, . . . it would have adopted some clear and definite

provision to effect it .

.

.

52

This passage speaks in a confusion of accents. While not forgoing
the liberal rhetoric of natural right and constitutional contract, the
justice's argument evinces unmistakably republican influences along
all four of our suggested axes of opposition, those respectively centered
on conceptions of interests, rights, political ethos, and participation
values. The argument conceives New Jersey's civil order as both a
common interest relative to New Jersey conditions and a social creation, a function or reflex of law made politically, by citizens. It further
conceives freedom as "positive," as consisting in political agency: freedom - once given a "state of political society" - resides in the making
of laws by "the people . . . for their own government."

52.

Post, 20 N.J.L. at 374-75.
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One can hardly fail to notice how easily the "republican" lineup substantive common good, politically grounded rights, deliberative
process, political agency constitutive of personal freedom - coalesces
around a solidaristic, and concomitantly hierarchical, sociological vision. Justice Nevius somehow felt able to justify his decision rhetorically not by denying that the petitioners were "men" entitled to civic
concern, but rather by insisting that they were. As such, they were
duly politically endowed with the rights suited to their proper social
positions, the rights of "protection and support" from their masters.0
Yet how can this be? Bad faith aside, how can the justice presume
to advise the petitioners that they, in their legalized subjugation, are
yet free by virtue of laws made by a constituency of "people" including
their dominators but excluding them? The opinion in State v. Post
quite fails to address the point, but if the author had answered according to the tradition from which (wittingly or not) he drew his argument,
I think he would have said that the petitioners were virtually represented.Justice Nevius apparently envisioned a world in which laws and
rights are (republicanly) the social works of citizens (republicanly)
deliberating with the common good sincerely at heart, but that is not
all he envisioned. Mixed, confused, transitional as his social imagination
may have been, it still recalls an early modern, post-feudal world in
which visionary social solidarism could present as equality what we
see as hierarchy. It recalls a world in which everyone, equally, lays
claim to membership in the social rank accepted as proper to him or
her; in which, if only the top rank are deemed fit to the work and
self-constitutive experience of direct political engagement issuing in
self-given laws, then, everyone accepts that arrangement, too. This
is a world in which people believe in intrinsic, characteristic differences
in merit and capacity among social groups or human types, such that
equality can possibly lie in ascription of the social rank proper to one's
person along with the rights duly appertaining to such rank. Yet it
is also a world in which people can somehow simultaneously believe

53. Cf. Steinfeld, supra note 39, at 342-47 (describing the nonproblematic standing in prenineteenth-century social and legal thought of such relationships of "dependence and governance"). In like vein, counsel for one of the respondents in State v. Post argued that to read
the "free and independent" clause as "repugnant" to slavery would be to read it (incredibly, he

meant) as no less "repugnant to the laws giving husbands control of wives, masters of apprentices,
parents of children, and landlords of the fruits of the labor of tenants." See Ernst, supra note
41, at 352.
54. On virtual representation and civic republicanism, see Michelman, Traces, supra note
10, at 50-52.
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that the top rank of citizen lawmakers is capable of full, empathic
insight into the needs and aspirations of others, the disfranchised,
from whom they so radically differ. It is the insight required of a
virtual representative - of the head of a household (or of a workforce,
town, district population, or any group both corporately and hierarchically conceived) who presumes to "represent" the interest of its disfranchised members. Seemingly, only a secure sense of human capacity
for social corporate solidarity of hierarchically ordered interests and
ends could have held such a vision together.
That seems especially true when we consider another of the vision's
latent tensions, arising from its understanding of political or civil liberty as positive - as self-government. Virtual representation of interests may be conceivable. Vicarious self-government is not. Insofar
as engagement in political self-government is deemed constitutive of
personal freedom, a given person's political disfranchisement is prima
facie highly suspect, demanding justification. In a normatively hierarchical sociological vision, justification for liberty-denying disfranchisement apparently can be found in attributions of political incapacity to
the lower orders.a Persistent infiltration into that vision of egalitarian
commitments will undermine that form of justification by universalizing the norm of self-government as a fundamental value and human
right.6 As applied to an aspect of experience conceived as personally
constitutive or emancipatory, any conceptual distinction between an
interest and a right becomes increasingly hard to maintain as, under
liberal egalitarian pressure, access to that experience is increasingly
perceived as a universal human value. 57
55. See Note, PoliticalRights as Political Questions: The Paradox of Luther v. Borden,
100 HARv. L. REV. 1125 (1987).
Domination resulting from exclusion from the franchise can be justified from a
republican standpoint, but only according to a principled standard: competency to
participate in political activity. That is, the exclusion from the franchise of people
who are capable of attaining freedom through political participation amounts to an
unjustifiable deprivation of their freedom precisely because they are capable .of
attaining it.
Id.
56. See Steinfeld, supra note 39, at 348 (discussing "a political dilemma of the first order"
arising out of emergent conflict between "the idea that all men were entitled to govern themselves" and "the legitimacy of the links between property, dependence, and governance"); id.
at 349 (explaining how "the republicanism" of the early modern period "served to reinforce
traditional hierarchical relationships of dependence even as it spread values [including that of
self-government] which progressively undermined them"); Note, The Disenfranchisement of
Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and the "Purityof the Ballot Box", 102 HARv. L. REV.
1300, 1308-09 (1989) (discussing conflict between "civic republicanism's exclusionary aspect" and
"modern state's commitment to equality and inclusion").
57. Here we meet a third conceptual instability - the distinction between interests and
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CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL-LEGAL DOCTRINE
ON SELECTIVE ENFRANCHISEMENT

Although the guarantee of equal protection of the laws has been
a part of the Constitution since 1868,58 judicial invalidation of state-law
franchise exclusions as denials of equal protection was virtually unknown to American constitutional law prior to the 1966 decision in
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections 9 The Supreme Court had on
several occasions rejected equal protection challenges to state franchise
exclusions on grounds unmistakably suggesting a judicial conception
of states as solidaristically deliberative polities, entitled as such to
regulate their membership according to their own notions of civic
competence and virtual representation. 60
But of course the solidaristic-republican world evoked by those
past decisions 61 has vanished from respectable American constitutional
discourse. As normative social hierarchy loses its ideological grip,

what once were regarded as social ranks have come to be regarded
as social differences. Where our predecessors evidently had glimpses
of a corporate social solid composed of hierarchically arranged personal
statuses, we now profess to see only a contentious plurality of persons
and groups having different, and often conflicting, perspectives, interests, and ends. Unsurprisingly, therefore, contemporary American
judicial argument in voting rights cases unanimously and liturgically

rights. Combined with instabilities in the distinctions between substance and procedure and
between politics and higher law, this additional conceptual instability helps to blur the differences
between Baker's models of "liberal republicanism" and "republican liberalism." See also supra
notes 6, 10.
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

59. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding poll taxes unconstitutional as denying equal protection with
respect to the right to vote). In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), and again in Lane
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), the Court found that Oklahoma's literacy test violated the
fifteenth amendment because of the racial discrimination wrought by its grandfather clause. But
in Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), the Court found no
equal protection objection to North Carolina's literacy test in the absence of proof of its use as
a pretext for race-based exclusion. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XV (forbidding abridgment
of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude); U.S. CONST.
XIX (forbidding abridgment of the right to vote on account of sex).
60. See, e.g., Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (upholding use of poll taxes),
(overruled by Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966)); Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (upholding denial of franchise to women). For a
discussion of civic republicanism and the Minor case, see Smith, 'One United People': SecondClass Female Citizenshipand the American Questfor Community, 1 YALE J. L. & Humx. 229,
262-63 (1989).

61. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss3/2

16

Michaelman: Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Arguments: Vo
DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW

rejects both solidaristic constructions of the aims of political deliberation and hierarchical constructions of political capacity. Yet the same
material not only continues to affirm deliberative aspirations for political process; it also suggests, although never unanimously and always

obliquely, the persistence in judicial intuitions and sensibilities of constitutive valuations of political participation rights. In those oblique
suggestions of a dialogic political ideal perhaps lie an aspect or remnant
of an older republicanism, a remnant capable of surviving the conquest

of American constitutional thought by pluralistic political sociology.62
Consider, then, the general contours of prevailing constitutional-

legal doctrine on selective enfranchisement.6

Given a territorially

bounded political unit in which popular elections occur, the general
rule of constitutional law is that any subjectively interested person is
entitled to admission to the electorate6 with these exceptions: State
laws, may exclude persons who (i) are not bona fide residents of the
political unit in question;6 (ii) have not attained a minimum age of
eighteen years or, at the state's option some lesser age; 67 (iii) have
ever been duly convicted of a felony;r8 (iv) cannot satisfy a reasonable
62. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
63. The Supreme Court has enunciated all of the constitutional-legal doctrine discussed in
this essay in the guise of interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's dictate that "[n]o State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court has held that, by force of the equal protection clause, "a
citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with
other citizens in the jurisdiction." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (citations omitted);
see also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74 (1973). The Court
has further held that this right is among those it classes as "fundamental," see, e.g., Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966), so that any restriction of it "must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized," id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62
(1964)), to determine whether it is 'necessary to promote a compelling state interest," e.g.,
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (citations omitted). Judicial
efforts to justify and apply the doctrine of strict scrutiny of laws excluding persons from the
franchise have generated the constitutional-legal doctrine described in the text.
64. I speak of entitlement to admission, rather than entitlement to vote, to allow for
reasonable registration requirements.
65. I include here local-government enactments authorized by state law.
66. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Obviously, I could have stated the general rule as one of prima facie entitlement of bona fide
residents (as opposed to persons subjectively interested) to admission to the electorate, rather
than treat bona fide residence requirements as one of the exceptions from a general rule against
exclusions. I have chosen the seemingly less natural way of setting things up to make more
perspicuous the issue posed by Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978). See
infra text accompanying notes 152-67.
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
68. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.
222, 233 (1985) (dictum) (declining to reconsider Ramirez). The Court in Ramirez upheld felony
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literacy requirement not shown to have a racially discriminatory purpose or to be discriminatorily administered; 69 (v) in cases of certain,
businesslike, "special-purpose" units supported by property taxes, own
no taxable property within the jurisdiction; 70 and (vi) possibly, "in

some circumstances," are otherwise so situated as to lack primary
interest in the affairs of the political unit in question.71 The Court has
held specifically that neither lack of property wealth nor failure to
pay any fee can constitute or signify the lack of "primary interest"
that might warrant exclusion of a resident from the electorate.72 Is it
possible to infer from this general-rule-cum-list-of-exceptions a com-

prehensive judicial conception of the character and point of democratic
politics that consistently governs the Court's determinations? In par-

ticular, does the doctrinal pattern disclose a consistent judicial commitment to either a strategic or a deliberative conception of the character
of political interaction, or to an instrumental or constitutive understanding of the point of political participation?
A.

Enfranchisement on the Basis of Interest

The cases we consider in this section present a common question

arising from facts conforming to the following pattern: Pursuant to
exclusions against equal protection challenge on the basis of strictly textual reasoning. Observing
that the congressional apportionment provision in section 2 of the fourteenth amendment expressly declines to reduce a state's representation because it disfranchises persons '"for participation in... crime,"' the Court reasoned that the equal protection guarantee in section 1 "could
not have been intended to prohibit outright... [the disfranchisement of criminals] which was
expressly exempted from the lesser sanction ... imposed by sec. 2." Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 42
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2). This reasoning has been subjected to strong criticism.
See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13-16, at 1094 (2d ed. 1988); Shapiro,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A PreliminaryView, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293, 303 (1976). For critical
examination of both "liberal" and "republican" justifications of disfranchisement of convicted
felons, see Note, supra note 56.
69. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). Current federal
legislation forbids the use of literacy tests. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa
(1982); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding constitutionality of Rights
Act of 1965).
70. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (upholding Arizona statute restricting suffrage
in agricultural improvement and power district to landowners); cf. Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969) (invalidating exclusion of nontaxpayers from city revenue-bond election);
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating exclusion of nonproperty
owners from city general-obligation bond election to finance general city facilities and services).
71. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 631 (expressly leaving
this question open).
72.

See Harper,383 U.S. 663 (1966). Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (forbidding exclusion

from federal presidential and congressional elections "by reason of failure to pay any poll tax
or other tax").
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state law, a governmental agency exercises significant coercive authority over aspects of social life occurrent within a specified territorial
jurisdiction. The agency's policies and actions are either directly controlled by the votes of a resident popular electorate or are controlled
by officers chosen by the votes of such an electorate. Relative to the
agency's specific range of authority, it is arguable that some of the
bona fide residents of the agency's territory stand out from the rest
as specially or "primarily" interested in the agency's exercises of
power. The question common to our cases is whether a state may
constitutionally restrict the agency's electorate to such a specially
concerned subset of the otherwise qualified residents of its territorial
base, pro tanto disfranchising the rest.
Preliminarily, we can sketch the states' most likely explanations
for their choices to disfranchise residents whose extra-political situations are such that they apparently have no concrete interests at stake
in a particular jurisdiction's political determinations and resultant exercises of authority. These explanations will vary somewhat, depending
on whether the prevailing ethos of the jurisdiction's political process
is imagined as strategic or deliberative.
If the process is imagined as deliberative, the standard argument
for preferring an electorate composed of persons with concrete ties
to the jurisdiction's business is straightforward: They are the ones
who are most likely to grasp sympathetically the concerns of others
who stand to be substantially affected by how that business is conducted 74 and who most confidently can be expected to devote the time
and energy required for mastering the issues.
If the ethos of the political process is imagined as strategic, the
most obvious objection to including those who initially lack material
stakes in the outcomes is distributional. To empower someone who
otherwise would have nothing at stake with a vote in a strategic
political arena is to endow that person with wealth - the value of
the benefits obtainable in exchange for her or his vote - at the
expense of other participants who do have interests inextricably at

73. For present purposes, there is no need to delve into the difficult matter of distinguishing
between the illegitimate concerns of a mere busybody and the legitimate concerns of an engaged
member of society regarding the morality of governmental actions or their effects on other
people's concrete interests or on social life at large.
74. This is surely one way to make sense of the argument that persons who "will not bear
any responsibility for [their] choices," because the laws to which those choices are directed will
not apply to them, "ought to be excluded" from a constituency on the ground that they are
"morally unqualified to participate." Dahl, ProceduralDemocracy, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS
& SOCIETY, FIFTH SERIES 97, 123 n.20 (1979) (emphasis in original).
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stake. A subtler reason for excluding "disinterested" persons is that
the correspondence of strategic outcomes to the actual preferences of
those affected may be thought to improve as participants increasingly
have similar patterns of interests at stake, as, for example, residents
of a homogeneous town typically stand to receive comparably valued
packages of protective and environmental services at the cost of property taxes paid directly or through landlords. There are grounds for
believing that an individualistic, self-serving political process can best
achieve outcomes conforming to individual preferences when the constituency is not splintered by sizable fractions of voters whose prepolitical stakes in the outcomes are sharply deviant from a typical
pattern. 5
1. Kramer, Cipriano, and Kolodziejski
The Supreme Court first considered whether a jurisdiction's electorate constitutionally may be restricted to a specially concerned subset of the otherwise qualified residents of its territorial base in Kramer
v. Union Free School District No. 15.7 The district was empowered
to regulate courses of study, textbook selection, school house locations,
salaries, and other expenditures and to fix the annual budgets to be
financed by local property taxes.7 By state law, the district's electoral
franchise was confined to otherwise qualified residents who were either
owners or lessees (or their spouses) of taxable real property within
the district or parents or guardians of children attending district
schools. 78 This regime excluded plaintiff Kramer, a childless man residing in his parents' home. 79
Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court concluded that the
blanket exclusion from the district's electorate of other subjectively
interested residents violated the latters' equal protection rights.80 The
district s contended that by limiting its electorate to the "community

75. See, e.g., J. PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 366-67 (1979);

W. RIKER

& P. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 101-06 (1973); cf.

Sterk, Nollan, Henry George and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1744-47 (explaining
why strategic politics have better chances of producing socially efficient outcomes when each
policy decision in turn presents a bilateral conflict of interests than when decisions involve
multilateral conflicts).
76. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
77. Id. at 623-24.
78. Id. at 623.
79. Id. at 624.
80. Id. at 633.
81. The district's argument was supported by the dissenting Justices. See 395 U.S. at 634-41
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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of interest" comprised of those residents "'directly affected"' by its
actions and in that sense "'primarily interested"' in them, it was
protecting the deliberative quality of its politics.82 Such a limitation
was in order, the district argued, because "the ever increasing complexity of the many interacting phases of the school system and structure make it extremely difficult for the electorate fully to understand
the whys and wherefores of the detailed operation of the school system" and because voters having direct stakes as parents and taxpayers
would dependably be motivated 'to acquire such information as they
may need" for informed political involvement.8
The Court apparently accepted arguendo the deliberative aspiration for school district politics implicit in the district's contention.4
However, it found no occasion to decide the question of whether such
an aspiration could ever justify a state in restricting a local electorate
to a subset of residents deemed "primarily interested" or "primarily
affected" in or by the activities of a governmental unit. Finding that
the restrictions challenged in Kramerwould exclude many "seemingly
interested and informed residents" while permitting "inclusion of many
persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect interest in school
affairs," ' the Court held that those restrictions were not closely
enough tailored to the state's claimed deliberative objective to "meet
the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise."
The Court thus treated plaintiff Kramer's subjective interest in
admission to the district electorate as the kind of constitutionally fundamental personal interest that excites "strict" judicial scrutiny of
state laws infringing it. "'[T]he right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights,"' explained the Court. Not only do "[s]tatutes grant-

82.
83.

Id. at 631 (majority opinion).
Id. The dissent compared the franchise restrictions in Kramer to (i) literacy tests,

upheld by the Court in Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1949),

on "the premise... that a State may constitutionally impose upon its citizens voting requirements
reasonably designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot,"' Kramer, 395 U.S. at 636 (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (quoting Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51), and to (ii) residence requirements, consistently

upheld because, on the dissent's account, "such requirements [are] designed to help ensure that
voters have a substantial stake in the outcome of elections and an opportunity to become familiar

with the candidates and issues voted upon." Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
84.
85.
86.

See id. at 632-33 & n.14 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 632-33.

87.

Id. at 632.

88.

Id. at 626 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
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ing the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the
danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives," but "[any unjustified
discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs
. . . undermines the legitimacy of representative government."
Read in isolation from the rest of the Court's opinion, these judicial
explanations of the constitutionally "fundamental" status of Kramer's
interest in admission to "political affairs" to which others in the neighborhood were admitted might most naturally suggest both the Court's
instrumental valuation of the franchise and its strategic conception of
politics. Yet the Court refused to rule that franchise exclusions cannot
be justified by a state's purpose of protecting the deliberative quality
of its political affairs.90 We have seen that instrumental valuations of
the worth of political participation are compatible with deliberative
conceptions of the character of political practice91 That combination
of assumptions might best explain the majority's reasoning and rhetoric
in Kramer, were it not for the haziness of Kramer's imaginable instrumental objectives. The express language of the opinion neither implies
nor rejects valuation of participation rights on constitutive grounds.
The Kramer Court thus constructed a strict-scrutiny framework
for appraising laws selectively excluding "otherwise qualified voters"
from certain votes affecting the exercise of governmental authority
within a territory containing their residences. Having done so, the
Court readily extended that framework to the appraisal of state laws
restricting to propertied taxpayers the right to vote on city bonds
financing city capital improvements. On the same day it decided
Kramer, the Court also decided Ciprianov. City of Houma,93 involving
a vote on a city's issuance of revenue bonds to finance improvements
in the city's gas, water, and electric utility systems.9 The case was
easy after Kramer because when bonds, as in this case, "are to be
paid only from the operations of the utilities [and]... are not financed
in any way by property tax revenue," all ratepayers obviously stand
to be "substantially affected" by the decision regardless of status as
propertied taxpayers.9 5 The Court could accept the city's contention

89.
90.

Id. at 626-27.
See id. at 632-33 n.14. Compare the Court's swift and confident rejections of attempts

by states to justify franchise exclusions by invoking notions of substantive common interest.
See infra text accompanying notes 135-36, 145-46.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
92. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 205 (1970).
93. 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam).
94. See id. at 702-03.
95. Id. at 705.
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that property owners as such had some distinctive interest in system
improvements because "the efficiency of the utility system directly
affects 'property and property values,"' while still finding no state
interest compelling enough to justify selective abridgment of fundamental rights of political participation.
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski97 was a little more difficult because
it involved general obligation bonds, as opposed to revenue bonds,
issued to finance various municipal facilities including nonproducers
of revenue such as administration buildings.9 8 The Court easily established that a city resident's interest in the quality of city facilities was
not strictly tied to real property ownership9 and that nonpropertied
residents likely would share in the cost burden. This would occur both
through the effects of real property taxes on prices of rental housing
and commercial goods and services and through the city's practice of
servicing its debt with revenues from local taxes unrestricted to taxes
on real property. 1°° Thus, the selective franchise exclusion again fell
before strict scrutiny. 101 Again, the Court's rhetoric suggests an instrumental understanding of the individual's constitutionally fundamental
interest in voting rights without excluding a constitutive one. And
again, the reasoning and rhetoric fully coincide with either a strategic
or a deliberative conception of political action.
2. Ball v. James
In what it came to treat as a series of cases distinct from the
Kramer line, the Court eventually resolved in the affirmative the
question left open in Kramer: Can a state ever justify selective enfranchisement among otherwise qualified residents of a governmental
jurisdiction according to the ways or degrees in which the conduct of
a given government's affairs affects their interests? Ball v. James °2
is the leading example.103

96. Id. at 704.
97. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
98. See id. at 205-06.
99. Id. at 210.
100. See id. at 210-12.
101. See id. at 213.
102. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
103. Ball was anticipated by Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist.,
410 U.S. 719 (1973) (California statutes did not violate equal protection clause in permitting
only landowners to vote in district general elections and by apportioning votes according to land
assessments), and Associated Enters. Inc. v. Toltec Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (per curiam)
(Wyoming watershed statute did not violate equal protection clause in allowing districts to be
established by referendum in which only landowners had franchise and their votes were weighted
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The public entity involved in Ball was the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District. 1 4 The district was organized as a political subdivision and municipal corporation of
Arizona.15 It supplied water and electric power to public and private
consumers in a territory encompassing a major part of the City of
Phoenix and seven other municipalities.'0 As of the time of the litigation, the district's electricity sales to 240,000 consumers accounted for
ninety-eight percent of operating income, and revenues from electrical
operations secured eighty-eight percent of the district's long-term
debt.'0 As a municipal utility, the district was exempt from state and
local property taxation, had the power of eminent domain,'08 and could
issue tax-exempt debt. 1 9
Moreover, and perhaps crucially, the district was exempt from
state administrative regulation of its rates and conditions of service,
states usually provide such exemptions for municipally owned utilities
on the theory that as popularly accountable public agencies they themselves "perform the public function of protecting the public interest"
in fair and reasonable rates and other terms of service." 0 In fact, this
district's policy had always been to set rates for its electricity with a
view to generating surpluses with which to subsidize the district's
production and distribution of irrigation water to agricultural landowners.," At the same time, landowners and only landowners formed
2
the voting constituency of the district."
To the Ball dissenters, the district's scheme of selective enfranchisement obviously denied equal protection to the district's nonpropertied residents. Not only did every resident have an ordinary citizen's
interest in the general economic and environmental ramifications of

according to acreage owned). In Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, (1975), which again invalidated
special voting rights for property owners in a general-obligation bond election, the Court offered,
as its key to distinguishing cases such as Kramer and Hill (in which it subjected franchise
exclusions to strict scrutiny) from cases such as Salyer and Toltec (in which it did not) the
question whether "the election in question is . . . of special [i.e., restricted, as opposed to
general] interest." Id. at 297. The facts and decision in Ball rendered this explanation untenable.
See infra text accompanying notes 104-26.
104. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 357.
105. See id. at 357-59.
106. Id. at 357.
107. Id. at 381-82 (White, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 378 (White, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 360 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 379 (White, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 383 (White, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 357 (majority opinion).
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the district's developmental policies, they all, as electric power consumers, had very specific and partisan interests in rate-setting, financing,
and related decisions of the district. 13 Those decisions directly affected
the distribution of wealth between the franchised class of landowning
consumers of subsidized district water and the disfranchised class of
nonlandowning consumers of subsidy-supporting district electricity."1

In the view of the dissenters, determination of a possible public interest in subsidizing agricultural operations with surpluses extracted

from electric utility consumers should not be 'totally in the hands" of
the agricultural operators. 115 If the fundamental nature of the right to
vote resides in the instrumental value of that right to the voter, the
16
dissenters' arguments, replete with apt quotations from Reynolds,
Kolodziejski,17 and Kramer,11 seem unanswerable. This is especially

so if the process of politics is envisioned as strategic.
How, then did the Court's majority, speaking through Justice
Stewart, distinguish the Kramer line of cases? First, said the Court,

the district is not a general governmental authority empowered to
levy ad valorem taxes, enact regulatory laws, or "administer such
normal functions of government as the maintenance of streets, the

113. See id. 381-85 (White, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 384 (White, J., dissenting) ("It is apparent that landowning irrigators are
getting a free ride at the expense of users of electricity.").
115. Id. (White, J., dissenting). It might be said in response that relief from political
oppression at the local level is always, at least in extremis or in principle, available from the
popularly accountable state legislature. Whatever comfort may lie in that observation, it offers
no help in distinguishing Ball from the Kramer line of cases, even considering that the 240,000
electric power consumers in Ball undoubtedly could mobilize more force at the state house than
could scattered individuals like Kramer who wanted a school-district vote even though they had
neither children nor taxable property at the mercy of a local school district. Presumably, the
decision in Ball would have been identical had the case involved only a handful of nonlandowning,
electricity consumers. Likewise, the Kramer court presumably would have invalidated a state
law permitting only parents (and not taxpayers at large) to vote in school district elections.
116. 'The right to vote is of special importance because the franchise acts to preserve 'other
basic civil ... rights."' Id. at 375 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562 (1964)).
117. "'[W]hen all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision,' the
Fourteenth Amendment 'does not permit... the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from
the franchise."' Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Phoenix V. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204, 209 (1970).
118. "Any state statute granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis poses the
'danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives."' Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)).
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operation of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare services." 119 The
Court, however, failed to explain how this observation would distinguish the case from Cipriano(in which only revenue bonds and municipal utility operations were involved).120 Nor does the district's lack
of general authority even begin to respond to the plaintiffs' complaint
of voiceless subjection to the coercive political power (in the form of
control over public utility rate-setting) of those who were their natural
economic adversaries.'12 Second, the Court noted that "the primary
and originating purpose" of the district was the "relatively narrow" one
of conserving and storing water for distribution to agricultural landowners according to an acreage-based entitlement system legally
beyond the district's control. Indeed, the district first originated as
the private instrumentality of specifically interested landowners and
later became a "nominal[ly] public" entity to qualify for financing cost
reductions available only to public agencies.'2 Again, the Court failed
to explain how these historical observations answered current complaints about irresponsible exercises of power over people's vital interests by a legally privileged government agency.
Finally, the Court offered this observation about the relationship
between the district and its electrical utility consumers: "[N]o matter
how great the number of nonvoting residents buying electricity from
the [d]istrict, the relationship between them and the [d]istrict's power
operations is essentially that between consumers and a business enterprise from which they buy.'m In this sense, "the provision of electricity
is not a traditional element of governmental sovereignty, . . .and so
is not in itself the sort of general or important governmental function
that would [subject] ... the government provider" to strict scrutiny
of selective exclusions from the franchise.'2 Once again, the Court
failed to explain how the prescriptive conclusion follows from the descriptive premise. Let us grant that the commercial relationship of
buyer and seller often can be distinguished from the political relationship of sovereign and subject. Still, Ball involved a setting in which
the distinction historically has been questioned by the practice of subjecting privately owned public utilities to consumer-protective oversight by courts of equity or administrative agencies. If ever there
were a case for constitutional protection of an instrumentally valued,

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 366 (majority opinion).
See Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 702 (1969).
See Ball, 451 U.S. at 383 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 367-68 (majority opinion).

123. Id. at 370.
124. Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
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self-protective right to vote, Ball was it. Thus argued the dissent and
answer came there none.
What might begin to explain (if not justify) the majority's conclusion, and its accompanying rhetoric of denial that the Salt River District constituted a government in the full sense, is the thought that
instrumental protection of extra-political interests neither exhausts
the value of a voting right to its holder nor alone suffices to explain
the first-magnitude status of such rights in the constitutional firmament. For insofar as rights of admission to political participation were
esteemed on constitutive, perhaps in addition to instrumental
grounds, 12 the Salt River District and its ilk - unlike the cities in
Ciprianoand Kolodziejski and the school district in Kramer- might
easily have been perceived as fora non conveniens for the realization
of the self-constitutive values of citizenship. Apparently required for
such realization is participation in the affairs of a "political community."' 6 Perhaps the majority Justices doubted - their notions of
"political community" remain to be explored - that the Salt River
District, given its history and the accompanying understandings about
its place in the lives of the people, defined or constituted any such
thing.
B.

Enfranchisement on the Basis of Residence

Always in the immediate background of the Court's consideration
of the "selective enfranchisement" question - and, indeed, necessarily
so - lies a set of assumptions about the universe of "otherwise qualified voters" composing a governmental unit's presumptive constituency, so that selective denial of the vote to any person in that
universe counts as an act of exclusion or disfranchisement calling for
justification. Chief among these assumptions is that bonafide residence
within a governmental unit's territorial base presumptively qualifies
the resident as a franchised member of that unit's political constituency. The Court has not often felt compelled to articulate the conceptions of political ethos (whether strategic or deliberative) and of
the value of voting rights (whether instrumental or constitutive) that
might underlie such an assumption. Residence, however, is not itself
an unambiguous or self-explanatory category. Cases that test debatable meanings or applications of a residence criterion against constitutional voting-rights norms provide a glimpse of underlying judicial
conceptions of political process norms and realities as well as of participation values.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
126.

See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972).
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1. Carrington, Cornman, and Blum
The earliest of the modern series of such cases is Carringtonv.
Rash,2 in which the Court invalidated a Texas law excluding from
the state's electorate residents who had first moved to Texas while
on military duty and had thereafter remained members of the armed
forces. m The plaintiff was a disfranchised serviceman whose good-faith
current residence in Texas and intention to make a permanent home
there were undisputed. 12
In defense of its law, Texas claimed "a valid interest in protecting
the franchise from infiltration by transients" who had not voluntarily
chosen Texas residence.130 Although the Court's account of the state's
argument left it at that, we can fairly infer a premise regarding the
aspirationally deliberative character of Texas politics. Texas evidently
was professing a concern that transient and involuntary inhabitants
would lack commitment to the effort required for political deliberation.
The court rejected the criterion of disfranchisement that Texas
purported to derive from this deliberative aspiration.131 Quite pointedly, however, the Court did not reject the legitimacy of such an
aspiration as a premise for state action. Rather, invoking the fundamental status of voting rights, the Court subjected the Texas law to
strict scrutiny and found it unacceptably overbroad. 22 If Texas meant
to "winnow" transient pseudo-residents from bona fide committed residents in compiling its voter lists, the Court held, it would have to
do so on a case-by-case basis.'3 Case-by-case inquiry might be administratively costly or cumbersome, but because "[w]e deal here with
matters close to the core of our constitutional system," the state could
not "deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote
administrative benefit to the state."' This reasoning presupposes the
legitimacy and practicality of Texas's deliberative aspiration for its
politics.
Texas had also advanced in defense of its disfranchisement rule a
claimed interest in "immunizing its elections from the concentrated
balloting of military personnel, whose collective voice may overwhelm
a small local civilian community."' Construing this defense as claiming
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

380 U.S. 89 (1965).
Id. at 96-97.
See id. at 90-91.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 93-94.
Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 93.
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a solidaristic interest in protecting the local community's indigenous
policies and values against alien disturbance, the Court curtly rejected
it as unconstitutional: "'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of
the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally

impermissible. "136
Apparently, then, the Court regarded the ideal of political deliber-

ation as quite distinct from the solidaristic aim of regulating local
politics with an eye to the advancement of some preexistent and dis-

tinctive local "public interest" or "common good." The justices must
have conceived political deliberation as a "liberal" medium for resolving
or accommodating differences in perceptions of interest - private or
public, individual or social - in ways somehow conducive to the well-

being of each participant. On such a pluralistic understanding of political deliberation, the special value of voting rights to individuals claiming them can rest on wholly instrumental grounds. But constitutive
grounds, again, are not excluded.
The Court returned to the question of constitutional restrictions
on state-law definitions of residence for franchise-distribution purposes
in Dunn v. Blumstein.13 7 Dunn involved a so-called durational-residency requirement, demanding, as a prerequisite to voter registration
in Tennessee, not just current, bonafide residence, but such residence

136. Id. at 94.
137. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), the Court reversed
a Maryland judicial ruling upholding state disfranchisement of residents of a federal enclave
(specifically, the NIH reservation lying within the boundaries of Montgomery County) on the
ground that enclave residents were not a "resident[s] of the State" within the meaning of that
term as used in the Maryland state constitutional provisions governing voter qualifications. Id.
at 421-26 (quoting IbD. CONST. art. I, § 1). The Supreme Court's decision was straightforward
after Carrington and Kramer. Maryland's asserted justification as rendered by the Court "to insure that only those citizens who are primarily or substantially interested in or affected
by electoral decisions have a voice in making them," id. at 422, might have rested on either a
strategic or a deliberative conception of state politics. As in Carringtonand Kramer, the Court
accepted the state's asserted interest in the integrity of its political process as a consideration
legitimately affecting regulation of the franchise, id. at 422, but found the challenged rule of
franchise denial too loosely fitting to that interest to pass strict scrutiny. Id. at 425-26. NIH
reservation residents were subject to many state and local government regulations and taxes,
and depended on many state and local government services. Id. at 424. That Congress might
at some future time preempt any or all of these regulatory, fiscal, and service functions in the
enclave could not justify denial of the franchise now. Id. at 423-24. Nor could exemptions of
enclave property from state and local real property taxes justify denial, especially considering
that Maryland did not exclude other persons living on tax-exempt property from its electorate
and could not constitutionally have done so in light of Cipriano v. City of Houma. Id. at 425
(citing Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)). For a synopsis of Ciprianoand related
cases, see supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
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for the preceding year. 1s As in Carrington, the state advanced in
defense of its rule both a solidaristic-republican aim for its political
outcomes 39 and a deliberative aim for its political process. 140 Also as
in Carrington,although more cautiously, the Court accepted arguendo

the legitimacy of the deliberative process aim.141 Again, however, the
Court concluded that the franchise-exclusion rule was not sufficiently
tailored to any legitimate, deliberative goal to pass the strict
scrutiny,'4 required because the right to vote is "fundamental" and
"preservative of all rights"'' and because laws controlling franchise
distribution "constitute the foundation of our representative society." 1"
As in Carrington,the Court peremptorily rejected the outcome-

oriented, common-interest aim as constitutionally illicit. "[T]he State,"
said the Court, presumably seeks to "require a period of residence
'
sufficiently lengthy to impress upon its voters the local viewpoint. 14
But Carringtonhad already determined that "Tennessee's hopes for
voters with a "'common interest in all matters pertaining to [the
'
community's] government' is impermissible.' 1
2. Holt Civic Club
That the Court associates state-solidarism with totalitarian oppression and accordingly regards a state's solidaristic pursuits as antithetical to constitutional liberty seems clear. 47 The Court to this extent

plainly aligns the Constitution with liberal pluralism. Less clear is

138. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 331. The statute allowed registration of only those persons who,
at the time of the next election, had been residents of the state for a year and county residents
for three months. Id.
139. The state defended its rule as designed to "[a]fford some surety that the voter has,
in fact, become a member of the community and that as such, he has a common interest in all
matters pertaining to its government .... ." Id. at 345 (quoting Brief for Appellants, at 15).
140. As to the deliberative aim, the state claimed an interest in assurance that the voter,
by virtue of having become "in fact" a member of the political community "'s, therefore, more
likely to exercise his right more intelligently."' Id. (citation omitted).
141. The Court, having '"noted" that "the criterion of 'intelligent' voting is an elusive one,
and susceptible of abuse," found that it could dispose of this case "without deciding as a general
matter the extent to which a State can bar less knowledgeable or intelligent citizens from the
franchise, cf. Evans v. Cornman ..... Id. at 356 (citing Evans v. Cornman, 390 U.S. 419 (1970)).
142. See id. at 357-59. "If the State seeks to assure intelligent use of the ballot, it may
not try to serve this interest only with respect to new arrivals." Id. at 359.
143. Id. at 336 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 562 (1964)).
144. Id. (quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969)).
145. Id. at 354-55.
146. Id.
147. For a discussion of "republican solidarism" and "liberal pluralism," see supra text
accompanying notes 5-8.
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how that stance can be reconciled with the Court's first premise in
every voting-rights case: that the Constitution permits states to use
bona fide, current residence within a governmental unit's territorial
base as a criterion of enfranchisement in that unit's affairs.
Classing voting rights as "fundamental," the Court has generally
demanded, with scant regard for considerations of administrative feasibility, a tight fit between franchise distinctions and some compelling
reason for imposing them. The Court grants that states may have
good reasons for purging a given jurisdiction's electorate of those who
cannot fairly assert a personal interest or stake in that jurisdiction's
affairs. Even so, the Court insists that states must draw and apply
the "interest" line precisely so as to avoid arbitrary discriminations
among those who assert interests. This schema leaves residence
criteria in obvious constitutional jeopardy.'4
In its first explicit defense of the general proposition that residence
is a constitutionally permissible franchise prerequisite, the Court in
Dunn explained that while residence requirements are subject to strict
scrutiny as are other franchise exclusions, they pass the test of tight
fit to a compelling interest14 However, the compelling interest contemplated by the Court in Dunn was not, and could not reasonably
have been, that of purging a jurisdiction's electorate of voters lacking
substantial or typical stakes in its affairs. In general, the correlation
between residence and interest is no better than roughly approximate.
It seems no tighter at all - much less a constitutional order of magnitude tighter - than the correlation between one's parent-or-taxpayer status and one's interest in school district affairs, rejected as
too loose by the Supreme Court in Kramer. 50 According to the Dunn
Court, per Justice Marshall, the reason why "[a]n appropriately defined
and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence" can "withstand close constitutional scrutiny" is because such a requirement "may
be necessary to preserve the basic concept of a political community."'' 5

The Court has thus affirmed the preservation of political community
as a value so compelling in the Constitution's sight that states may
legitimately pursue that value even at the cost of overriding the fundamental rights of would-be voters whose substantial stakes in a jurisdiction's affairs are undeniable.

148. See, e.g., Levinson, Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote?, 41 FLA. L. REv.
545 (1989).
149. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343-44.
150. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 621 (1969).
151. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343-44 (citations omitted).
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Now, from Carrington,Cornman, and Dunn, we know what the
"compelling" value of "political community" cannot be, according to
the Court's understanding: It cannot be the value of cultivating a
solidaristic-republican commitment to a local substantive common interest. But then what is this value?
As clearly as any case could, Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa152 forced consideration of this question. The case did so by
presenting, in highly testing circumstances, the issue of what counts
as residence. The plaintiffs' homes were located beyond the corporate
city limits of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, but within a three-mile band of
territory skirting those limits that fell, according to Alabama law,
under the "police jurisdiction" of the city.154 The plaintiffs' activities

in and around their homes were thus made subject to the city's "police
and sanitary regulations." Moreover, those who carried on businesses,
trades, or professions in the police jurisdiction were subject to the
city's licensing powers, although the city could charge them license
fees of no more than one half the amount chargeable in respect to
similar activities conducted within city limits.154
The plaintiffs, supported by Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, 165
attacked the constitutionality of Alabama's "police jurisdiction" regime
by an argument in the alternative. They claimed that by subjecting
nonresidents to the coercive governmental powers of the city while
refusing them voting rights in city elections, Alabama must either be
depriving them of liberty and property without due process of law or
else violating their equal protection rights against inadequately justified exclusion from the electoral constituency of a governmental body
to whose authority they were subject by reason of residence. These
equal protection rights the plaintiffs viewed as well established in
Kramer, Cipriano, Kolodziejski, Carrington, Cornman, and Dunn.
They recalled the Court's standard arguments for strict scrutiny of
franchise exclusions- 56 and urged that "[t]he residents of Tuscaloosa's
police jurisdiction [were] vastly more affected by Tuscaloosa's decision-

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

439 U.S. 60 (1978).
See id. at 61.
See id. at 61-62.
See id. at 80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"Because 'statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our represen-

tative society,'... we have subjected such statutes to 'exacting judicial scrutiny' (citing Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626, 628 (1969)). Indeed, 'if a challenged

statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, "the Court
must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to a compelling state interest.""' Holt,
439 U.S. at 80-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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making processes than were the plaintiffs in either Kramer or Cipriano
affected by the decisionmaking processes from which they had been
unconstitutionally excluded."''5 7
The Court's majority, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, rejected
these claims. Its reasoning was starkly simple: because the plaintiffs
were not "physically resident within the geographic boundaries of the
governmental entity concerned,"'1 they simply had no entitlement to
inclusion in that unit's electorate; "our cases have uniformly recognized
that a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political processes to those who reside within its borders."'159
An initial apparent weakness in that reasoning, as Justice Brennan's dissent forcefully pointed out, is that the precedents had established only that franchise exclusions resulting from residency requirements would be constitutionally acceptable if those residency requirements were themselves "appropriately defined."' "[T]alismanic" invocations and arbitrary, state-law "characterizations of residency," the
dissent aptly insisted, had not been regarded as "controlling for purposes of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment.161
Accepting that 'appropriately defined' residency requirements for
enfranchisement are constitutionally permissible, Brennan fairly saw
the issue in Holt as whether the particular residency requirement
under attack, insofar as it excluded inhabitants of Tuscaloosa's police
jurisdiction from the city's municipal elections, could be defended as
appropriately defined. His conclusion was that "[t]he criterion of geographical residency" as "applied to this case" was not only inappropriately defined but "entirely arbitrary" because no one could explain
why "the 'government unit' which may exclude from the franchise
those who reside outside of its geographical boundaries should be
composed of the city of Tuscaloosa rather than of the city together
with its police jurisdiction."' 62
For a residency requirement for enfranchisement to be "'appropriately defined,"' Brennan reasoned, it must be compatible with the
high purpose for which such requirements are constitutionally permitted. That purpose, said Brennan (following Dunn), is "'to preserve

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
v. Cornman,

at 85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
at 68 (majority opinion).
at 68-69 (citing, inter alia, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972); Evans
398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 625; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.

89, 91 (1965).
160. Id. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343).
161. Id. at 81-82 (citing Cornman, 398 U.S. at 419; Carrington,380 U.S. at 89).
162. Id. at 87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the basic conception of a political community"'163 and "at the heart of
our basic conception of a 'political community,"' he said,
[i]s the notion of a reciprocal relationship between the process of government and those who subject themselves to
that process by choosing to live within the area of its authoritative application . ...

Statutes . . . which fracture

this relationship by severing the connection between the process of government and those who are governed . . . thus
undermine the very purposes which have led this Court in
the past to approve the application of... residency requireThe residents of Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction
ments ....
are [greatly] affected by Tuscaloosa's decision-making processes .... The Court does not explain why being subjected
to . . . such extensive power does not suffice to bring the
residents of Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction within the political community of the city .... 164
The Holt majority was not quite silent on this question. The majority's declared position was simply that some line has to be drawn on
constitutional entitlements to admission to state and local government
electorates, and the line of residence within the formally defined boundaries of the government unit in question is the one our system accepts.
Various regulatory and nonregulatory actions of local and state governments can have gravely important extraterritorial impacts: how the
city or state develops its economy, where it locates its garbage dumps,
how it zones its land. Additionally, actions of local and state governments have significant intraterritorial impacts on commuters and other
visitors. No one seriously could maintain that each person exposed to
significant effects from governmental actions is thereby constitutionally entitled to vote in the elections of every state and local government
producing those effects. Some limiting rule must govern franchise
entitlement. To draw the line, as Brennan would, between a claimant's
residence-fixed exposure to the "direct effects" of extraterritorial regulatory power and "the indirect though equally dramatic extraterritorial effects of purely internal municipal actions" would make "little
sense" as a practical matter; it would just unwarrantably saddle the
Constitution with "the Austinian notion of sovereignty."13 What remains is the criterion of residence within formally declared corporate

162. Id. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting from Dunn, 405 U.S. at 344).
164. Id. at 82-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 69-70 (majority opinion).
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limits. This may not be a perfect solution, Justice Rehnquist can be
heard as saying, but it is a workable one. 1'
In response to the majority, Justice Brennan simply denied the
overwhelming difficulty of drawing the "residence" line on a functional
basis corresponding to a defensible, substantive theory of political
community. The distinction is "crystal-clear," Brennan wrote,
Between those [like the appellants] who.., are.., subject
to [the] city's [direct regulatory authority], and those who
reside in neither the city nor its police jurisdiction, and who
are thus merely affected by the indirect impact of the city's
decisions. This distinction... is consistent with, if not mandated by, the very conception of a political community underrecognition of bona fide residency relying constitutional
67
quirements.1
The debate between the majority and the dissenting justices in
Holt seems to turn on resolutions of certain variables in the underlying
normative conception of "political community." Suppose, to begin with,
that one rejects the solidaristic-republican aim of inculcating into the
local political process, and promoting through it, a substantively specific notion of the local community's common or public interest. Suppose, further, that one conceives the "fundamental" value of a voting
right to its holder to lie in its instrumental utility to that holder in
promoting or protecting his or her pre-political interests in a political
process (which may be strategic, deliberative, or some mix of the
two). Surely, one would then not only find Justice Brennan's account
of "political community"' congenial, but would also find Brennan having much the better of the argument between him and Justice Rehnquist. For according to the pluralistic and instrumentalist settings
of the normative variables I have just mentioned, Rehnquist's faute de
mieux defense of the formal corporate boundary as the constitutionallegal discriminant of "residence" is untenable.
Rehnquist's doctrine surrenders abjectly to a state's power to manipulate franchise distributions by drawing corporate boundaries arbitrarily vis-a-vis corporate empowerment. As Brennan justifiably insisted, the surrender is contrary in spirit to the teaching of
Cornman.169 It is also quite unnecessary, as long as we can find a
166. 'The line heretofore marked by this Court's voting qualifications decisions coincides
with the geographical boundary of the governmental unit at issue, and we hold that [the]
appellants' case, like their homes, falls on the farther side." Id.
167. Id. at 87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 163-64, 167.
169. See Holt, 439 U.S. at 86 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S.
419 (1970)).
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criterion for distinguishing between "residents" and "nonresidents" of
Tuscaloosa that has both the formal characteristics of a justiciable
standard and some detectible tendency - any is categorically better
than none - to discriminate between the two in a way that corresponds
functionally with the correct, normative conception of political community. Brennan argues that in the circumstances of the Holt case, the
criterion of residential anchorage within range of a substantial battery
of city regulatory powers plainly has the desired properties, both
formal and functional.
In expanded form, the argument rests on two, seemingly indisputable premises. First, while the interests of countless people residing
outside the corporate boundaries of a city may be indirectly affected
by that city's governmental decisions, only a specific subset of those
people are further subject by reason of their residential anchorage to
some portion of the city's direct regulatory authority. Second, the
incremental magnitude of the consequent interests of the members of
that subset in that city's political affairs compares fairly with that of
successful franchise-exclusion plaintiffs in other constitutional cases.
Proceeding from those two premises, Brennan contends that denial of
voting rights to members of that subset cannot be justified on the
ground that their claim to enfranchisement is just impossible to distinguish legally from that of indirect-spillover victims. Given an instrumental understanding of the constitutionally preferred status of voting
rights, Brennan's argument is a hands-down winner.
It seems, then, that any possibility of a conscientious defense of
the Holt majority's position against Brennan's argument will require
a quite different normative conception of political community, one that
involves a constitutive understanding of the fundamental value of the
voting right.170 What might serve is a conception in which the commu170. The majority's conclusion, although not its opinion, may conceivably be explained on
instrumentalist grounds. The beginnings of such a defense would call attention to the reasons
for thinldng that inclusion within a voting constituency of "disinterested" persons - those who
can vote 'irresponsibly" because they will not be subject to the laws their votes may help enact

- may well impair either the soundness or sincerity of that constituency's deliberative politics
or the allocative efficiency of its strategically driven system of public choice. See supra text
accompanying notes 74-75. In that sense, residents of Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction were,
obviously, disinterested in some significant fraction of Tuscaloosa's complete political agenda.
The Tennessee legislature was thus faced with a choice among (i) accepting the political-process
impairments resulting from including the Holt residents as full fledged Tuscaloosa voters; (ii)
accepting the political-process impairments resulting from excluding them completely from Tuscaloosa politics; (ill) inviting confusion and resentment by assigning them some arbitrary fraction
of a full vote; and (iv) forgoing the policy objectives of the police-jurisdiction arrangement itself.
We can imagine a court concluding that choice (i) is constitutionally justifiable, even under strict
scrutiny, considering the alternatives. Taking his opinion at face value, however, that is not
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nity is primarily defined by subjective membership rather than objective interest; in which the community's internal bonds are something
more like civic friendship than procedural accountability; in which the
essence of community lies more in meaning than in power. "City"
would then signify something qualitative about the attitudes of members toward each other or toward their common enterprise of government. This something might be shared apprehension of and commitment to a specific, substantive understanding of the common good. It
might be a commitment signified and made by moving into the community's well-defined corporate space. One adopting such a view would
be to that extent a solidaristic republican.
Alternatively, one might think that the qualitative attitude definitive of community membership is that of commitment to a process of
civic dialogue, or dialogic politics, in a spirit suitably cognizant of the
constitutive value of dialogic political engagement to each of its participants taken severally. Again, a person's commitment to such a process
would have to be indispensably a matter of choice: one can join if one
chooses,171 but one cannot remain aloof from the process, hover around
its edges, and claim the status of a franchised member.'72
If either a solidaristic or a pluralistic-dialogic conception of political
community could possibly begin to make sense of the majority position
in Holt, which conception is the more appropriate imputation? The
Court's denials, in Carrington,Cornman, and Dunn, of the constitutional legitimacy of solidaristic-republican grounds for franchise exclusions seem both heartfelt and shared by members of the Holt majority.17 On the other hand, five of the six justices composing the Holt

what Justice Rehnquist's Holt majority concluded. The opinion does advert to Tennessee's
interest in utilizing the police-jurisdiction arrangement in the pursuit of legitimate policy goals.
See Holt, 439 U.S. at 73-75. It does so, however, only in the course of concluding that the
arrangement passes a low-level scrutiny, rational-basis test, after having "stripped" the plaintiffs'
claim of the "voting rights attire" that purported to invite strict scrutiny. See id. at 70. For a
discussion of the majority's argument for that first, and crucial, step in its reasoning, see supra
text accompanying notes 158-66.
171. This is not to say one would necessarily think that anyone who chooses must be
permitted to join, or that membership does not properly remain under the control of the current
members. One might favor, or accept, a closed and exclusive form of dialogic republicanism.
But see Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 1, at 1504-05, 1526-30 (arguing that closure and
exclusion are inconsistent with basic values of political dialogue).
172. Such an emphasis on an individual's choice as determining her or his membership may
be regarded as a "liberal" ingredient in this speculative account of the Holt majority's position.
Cf. Note, supra note 56, at 1304-06 (criticizing liberal social-contract rationale for disfranchisement of ex felons).
173. The Holt majority included Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. See Holt, 439 U.S. 60. Justice Stewart joined the majorities
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majority composed the majority in Ball v. James. We have already
seen how a plausible explanation for a perception of constitutionally
significant difference between the Ball case, in which an intra-residential franchise exclusion was upheld, and the cases in the Kramer line,
in which such exclusions were rejected, lies precisely in an attribution
of constitutive value to rights of participation in politics conceived as
dialogic.174
C.

Enfranchisement on the Basis of Competence

As late as the Lassiter decision of 1959,175 the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld a North Carolina reading and writing prerequisite
for admission to the vote on the stated ground that "the ability to
read and write... has some relation to standards designed to promote
intelligent use of the ballot." The deliberative-politics premise underlying that stance seems evident. Why else would one person's "intelligence" in his or her "use of the ballot" be a legitimate public concern?176

Despite repeated opportunity for repudiation,'7 the Court has ever
since professed adherence to the stance it took in Lassiter. But the
Court has not had to face the issue squarely at any time subsequent
to its 1966 decision in Harperv. Virginia State Board of Elections,178
holding poll taxes unconstitutional. (Since 1970 it has been spared any
possible occasion for doing so by congressional legislation barring the
use of literacy tests.179 ) Thus, a fair question remains as to whether

in all of Carrington,Cornman, and Dunn. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 330 (1972);
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 419 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 89 (1965). Chief

Justice Burger joined in Cornman. His dissent in Dunn rested on grounds suggesting no
disagreement with the majority's anti-solidaristic stance. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 363 (Burger,

C.J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, concurring specially in Dunn, indicated agreement with
the majority's anti-solidarism. See id. at 360-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

174. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
175.

Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51, 53 (1959).

176. A paternalistic account of Lassiter, consistent with strategic and perhaps even pluralistic assumptions, may be conceivable. Cf. Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in
Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 64749 (1982) (defending paternalistic interventions in certain

circumstances). But such an account seems a good deal more farfetched than the deliberative
account.
177. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131-34 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.); id. at
144-47 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id. at 216-17 ( Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);

id. at 231-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 282-84 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-50 (1966).
178.
179.

383 U.S. 663 (1966).
See supra note 69.
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the Court's republicanly grounded acceptance of literacy tests survives
Ha?-per.
Justices Black and Harlan, dissenting in Harper,18° apparently
would have accepted a defense of the constitutionality of state poll
tax laws based on solidaristic-republican grounds. According to Justice
Black, such laws might well reflect a state's "belief that voters who
pay a poll tax will be interested in furthering the State's welfare when
they vote."1s 1 According to Justice Harlan:
[P]roperty qualifications and poll taxes have been a traditional part of our political structure .... [I]t is certainly a
rational argument that payment of some minimal poll tax
promotes civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not
care enough about public affairs to pay $1.50 or thereabouts
a year for the exercise of the franchise. It... was probably
accepted as sound political theory by a large percentage of
Americans through most of our history, that people with
some property have a deeper stake in community affairs,
and are consequently more responsible, more educated, more
knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means, and that the community and Nation would be
better managed if the franchise were restricted to such citizens .... These viewpoints, to be sure, ring hollow on most
contemporary ears .... [They] are not in accord with
current egalitarian notions of how a modern democracy
should be organized .... [I]t is all wrong, in my view, for
the Court to adopt the political doctrines popularly accepted
at a particular moment of our history and to declare all
others to be irrational and invidious, barring them from the
range of choice by reasonably minded people acting through
the political process. 182
The evidence for Justice Harlan's acceptance of solidarism lies not
only in his allusions to stakes in community affairs and good community
management, but also in his apparently unselfconscious embrace of
virtual representation.11 That embrace seems implicit in his appeal to
"choice by reasonably minded people acting through the political process" as justifying the disfranchisement of a class of persons - "those
without means" - whose complaint is precisely that they are excluded
from the "people" exercising the "choice."

180.
181.
182.
183.

See Harper, 383 U.S. at 670-86 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 674 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 680, 684-86 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
For a discussion of virtual representation, see supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
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Given dissents rising to the defense of a constitutional vision not
only deliberative but solidaristic, it is natural to read the majority's
decision in Harper as rejecting such a vision in favor of some other
more in accord with the modern pluralist temper. On one such reading,
Harperwould finally confirm "the Reconstruction Amendments as the
vehicle by which the country.

. .

abandoned ancient notions of civic

solidarity and decisively moved to modern notions of liberal individualism, including a pluralist political premise that differs from republicanism precisely at the point of caring not for citizenly competence."'8
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Harperno doubt encourages such a reading by its pointed explanation that "'the political
franchise of voting"' is considered "a 'fundamental political right"'
because it is "'preservative of all rights.' ' ' 8 A self-serving, instrumental valuation of the franchise fairly leaps from that formulation. Yet
in subsequent cases involving property-based exclusions from political
participation, the Supreme Court has not located the special value of
political participation rights solely in their utility as instruments of
self-protection and self-aggrandizement in political affairs.'8 On the
total evidence of his opinion for the Court in Harper, neither did
Justice Douglas in that case.

184. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution, supra note 10, at 1331. In Possession vs.
Distribution,I continued:
The modern pluralist vision does not care about competence, on this reading,
because unlike republicanism, it puts comparatively little stock in dialogic persuasion as a means to assert, clarify, and politically evaluate interests that deserve
public respect or support. Instead, modem pluralism relies on the 'pure procedural
justice' of arms-length political exchange, subject to a set of guaranteed supra-political rights, for an acceptable distribution of governmental responses to private
interests deemed publicly unexaminable.
Id. (citations omitted).
This article proposes a somewhat different view. See supra text accompanying notes 18-32;
infra text accompanying note 191.
185. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 667 (quoting from Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886)).
186. Most recently, in Quinn v. Millsap, 109 S. Ct. 2324 (1989), the Court unanimously held
that it was unconstitutional "to require land ownership of all appointees to a body authorized
to propose [to the voters] reorganization of local government," because the equal protection
clause protects "the 'right to be consideredfor public service without the burden of invidiously
discriminatory disqualifications."' Id. at 2331-32 (quoting from Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346,
362 (1970)) (emphasis added). As it had in Turner, invalidating a requirement of land ownership
for local school board membership, the Court in Quinn accepted arguendo the legitimacy of
laws aimed at ensuring that local governing body members are knowledgeable about local problems and issues and are "attached to their community," but concluded that land ownership
requirements lacked rational relationship to these objectives. Id. at 2332.
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Consider the grounds on which Douglas offered to distinguish poll
taxes from the literacy tests upheld in Lassiter:
[The] Lassiter case does not govern the result here, because,
unlike a poll tax, the "ability to read and write . . . has
some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent
use of the ballot. . . . Voter qualifications have no relation
to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax
. . . . Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to
one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.16 7
That this distinction lacks conviction as applied to an annual $1.50
test of political commitment and awareness8 - that Douglas preferred
a patently weak distinction to simple rejection of Lassiters deliberative-politics premise - seems only to confirm the apparent strength
of his (or his colleagues') attachment to the premise.
How, then, might one understand Justice Douglas's total argument
in Harper, which views voting rights as fundamental because they
are "preservative of all rights" and at the same time finds a voter's
"intelligence," or the lack thereof, a matter of legitimate public concern? The most obvious way of combining those two stances seems
too fraught with solidarism to be plausibly Douglas's.
That way is suggested by Quentin Skinner's reading of Machiavelli,
according to which the Machiavellian republican solidaristic ideology
of political participation, common good, and civic virtue springs,
paradoxically, from concern about the preservation of individual liberty. In Machiavellian republican thought, writes Skinner,
[o]nly those who place themselves whole-heartedly in the
service of their community are capable of assuring their own
liberty ....
[T]he liberty of individual citizens depends in
the first place on their capacity to fight off "servitude arising
from outside." But this can be done only if they are willing
to undertake the defence of their polity themselves ....
Personal liberty also depends ... on preventing the grandi
from coercing the popolo into serving their ends. But the
only way to prevent this from happening is to organize the
polity in such a way that each and every citizen is equally
able to play a part in determining the actions of the body
politic as a whole . . . . [T]he price we have to pay for

187. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666-68 (quoting from Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959)).
188. See Baker, Republican Liberalism, supra note 6, at 505-07.
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enjoying any degree of personal freedom with any degree
of continuing assurance is voluntary public servitude ....
[O]nly those who behave virtuously are capable of ensuring
their own freedom. 189
Skinner's argument, paradoxical to ears attuned to the higher-law
constitutionalism of trans-political individual rights and liberties, conveys a special republican sense of the idea that enfranchisement, the
occupation of citizenship, is "preservative of' those conditions of personal liberty Americans rank foremost among cherished rights:
[T]o conceive [our personal liberty] as a right, as a species
of moral property, and to defend it absolutely against all
forms of external interference, [republicans must] maintain,
is not merely the epitome of corrupt citizenship, but is also
(like all derelictions of social duty) in the highest degree an
instance of imprudence. The prudent citizen recognizes that,
whatever extent of negative liberty he may enjoy, it can
only be the outcome of - and if you like the reward of a steady recognition and pursuit of the public good at the
expense of all purely individual and private ends.1
Thus, to the arch-republican Machiavelli, on Skinner's reading, the
franchise is both republicanly and instrumentally "preservative of all
rights." But the argument seems yet too solidaristic, too Spartan, too
statist, for Douglasian sensibilities.
Suppose we try to translate the argument into terms better suited
to the modern American context of political pluralism. So translated,
the claim is that we all take an interest in each others' enfranchisement
because (i) our choice lies between hanging together and hanging separately; (ii) hanging together depends on reciprocal assurances to all
of having one's vital interests heeded by the others; and (iii) in the
deeply pluralized conditions of contemporary American society, such
assurances are not attainable through virtual representation, but only
by maintaining at least the semblance of a politics in which everyone
is conceded a voice.
Even thus diluted with pluralism, the Machiavellian argument
seems disconsonant with the Emersonian individualism we associate
with Justice Douglas. Consider, therefore, an alternative account of
Douglas's position in Harper, according to which one's franchise is
one's badge of inclusion in a constitutive political dialogue and thus
189.

Skinner, The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophicaland Historical Preferences, in

PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY 193, 213-14 (R. Rorty, J. Schneewind, & Q. Skinner eds. 1984);
accord W. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 206-07 (citing Tocqueville in support of this view).

190. Skinner, supra note 189, at 218.
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485

"preservative" of one's liberty in the positive, political sense.191 We
thus imagine the justice assigning constitutive value directly to the individual's experience of involvement in the dialogue, as opposed to
regarding that involvement as strictly instrumental to the individual's
ulterior ends. That would give Douglas a reason, apart from Machiavellian Spartan-statism, for endorsing Lassiter's affirmation of the interest of all in the "intelligent" participation of each. For the quality
of the dialogue, then, is something that matters to each participant
individually, as a person supposedly deriving value from the dialogic
experience itself.
V.

CONCLUSION

According to what I understand to be a republican ideal conception,
politics is a field in which persons reciprocally exercise their capacities
for changing and becoming by and through communicative relations.
It is a dialogic process of persons overcoming, through confrontation
with difference, the moral stasis and self-satisfaction of sameness. I
have suggested here that signs of such a self-constitutive notion of
politics can be found in the official writings of Supreme Court Justices
on issues of constitutional protection for voting rights. More broadly,
I have suggested that the dialogic notion of participation in politics
as a constitutive human good may be a republican remnant in contemporary American constitutional thought.'2
I have so far said nothing about what one ought to make of this
proposition, if it is true, and it is now time to state carefully what
lessons I do and do not mean to draw from the sort of analysis I have
193
conducted. Let us use the Holt case as an example.
First, despite my obvious sympathy for an ideal conception of politics as dialogic,'9 I do not mean my discussion of the Holt opinions
to say that the majority judged better than the dissenters did. Visionary ideals are one thing; actual prevailing vision and practice are
another. The ideal and the actual may be far apart, and judicial prerogatives of decision and explanation are not always aptly or justly
spent on trying to close the gap. It may be that on some occasions
they are, 195 but I think it clear that the Holt case was not one of those
and that the dissenters in Holt judged better.
191. See supra text accompanying note 33.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
193. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
194. See Baker, Republican Liberalism, supra note 6, at 491.
195. Cf. Fisher, The Significance of PublicPerceptionsof the Takings Doctrine, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1774 (1988) (urging attention to the effects of judicial decisions and explanations on
popular political-moral understanding).
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Second, I do not claim that the author of the majority opinion in
Holt, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 19 has ever consciously and focally identified dialogic politics as a weighty principle of American constitutionalism to be consistently given its due in judicial reasoning
whenever it is relevant. At most, I claim that the value is sometimes
"there" for him. It may be there in the kind of subverted form that
I once called "somewhat disguised and twisted."'1 A value (or normative impulse) thus "present" would tend to appear sporadically and
inconsistently - perhaps opportunistically - in the course of a given
judge's work. The other factors in a case that would catalyze that
value's presence to that judge might be such that its manifestations
in that judge's work would tend to occur in decisions that by my lights
are wrong, not right. 1' Conversely, it might exert no influence for
that judge in cases where I would think it ought to have helped
produce a decision contrary to his. 1' There is no republican or any
other kind of "solace" 200 to be found in this material, and I mean to
offer none.
Third, even to speak as I have of "claiming" that the dialogic-politics
value is "there" for any judge or group of judges is already to speak
too strongly. It is a hypothesis I offer rather than a claim: a hypothesis
196. See Holt, 439 U.S. at 61.
197. See Michelman, Traces, supra note 10, at 23.
198. For example, see the majority opinions in Holt, 439 U.S. at 60 (residents of city's
police jurisdiction, but not living within city's corporate city limits, had no right to inclusion in
city's electorate), and Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (Arizona statute providing that voting
in elections for agricultural and power district was limited to landowners did not deny equal
protection).
199. For examples, see the abortion funding cases. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (Hyde Amendment limiting use of federal funds to reimburse costs of abortions under
Medicaid did not violate constitutionality protected right of personal privacy); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977) (equal protection clause does not require state participating in Medicaid to
pay expenses for nontherapeutic abortions for indigents). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986) (Georgia's criniinalization of homosexual sodomy did not violate the fundmental
personal-privacy rights of homosexuals). Compare Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum:
InalienableRights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV.
330, 332-33, 335, 338 (1985) (criticizing the abortion-funding decisions as failing to understand
the rights of women to terminate unwanted pregnancies as '"nalienable" by virtue of their public
value in securing "systemic norms ... concerned with structuring power relationships to avoid
the creation or perpetuation of hierarchy"), with supratext accompanying note 191 (construing
Harperas perceiving the right to vote as fundamental because similarly "relational" in character).
For a criticism of Hardwick on similar grounds, see Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 1,
at 1528-35. Moreover, the unanimous and sustained antipathy to antique republican solidarism
displayed by the Supreme Court in recent voting-rights cases, see supra text accompanying
notes 135-36, 145-46, disastrously was missing from the majority's treatment of Hardwick. See
supra note 1, at 1494-95, 1526.
200. See generally Mensch & Freeman, Hobbesian America, supra note 10.
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to be tested (on any audience, including any judge) simply by the act
of advancing it. Insofar as the hypothesis is valid (and comprehensibly

expressed), it may have consequences for the future actions of those
for whom it is; those consequences will be its validation. To put it
another way: Some - not all - ideologies are potentially utopian.

The only way to tell, if you care, is to try.
There may be good reason for the democracy-minded to care, now,
about the revitalization of whatever remnant of an ideal - or ideology
of self-constitutive, dialogic politics may remain in American constitutional vision. It is possible that the country stands at the brink
of a wave of "privatization" that, especially should it occur without
sustained resistance, will further and irreversibly depoliticize American life for a long time to come. One arresting example: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts recently adopted a statute authorizing the
incumbent governing bodies of the City of Chelsea to execute a con-

tract with Boston University providing for a ten-year takeover by the
University of "authority and responsibility for the management, super-

vision, and oversight" of Chelsea's public primary and secondary education. 211 One result for Chelsea residents will be devotion to Chelsea
educational services of a quantity of monetary and other resources
available to the University, but not otherwise to Chelsea. Another
will be to single out Chelsea from all other Massachusetts school dis-

tricts for a uniquely depoliticized form of public education governance. 2 2 By comparison with everyone else in the state, individual
201. Agreement Between Chelsea School Committee and Trustees of Boston University §
D [hereinafter "Agreement"] (1989); see 1989 MASs. AcTs ch. 133.
202. The agreement is terminable at any time by majority vote of the popularly elected
Chelsea School Committee. Id. H(3), at 41. For as long as the agreement remains in force,
Boston University will exercise the same broad authority over matters of local public education
policy and governance in Chelsea that under laws applicable everywhere else in the state is
directly exercised by elected school committees and their appointed superintendents of schools.
See id. D; see also MAss. CONST. ch. 6 (forbidding use of public money or credit to support
schools not "under the exclusive control, order and supervision of public officers or public agents
authorized by the Commonwealth or federal authority"); MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 71, §§
35-67 (1978) (prescribing powers and responsibilities of school committees and superintendents
of schools). The Agreement provides that a majority vote of the Chelsea School Committee can
require Boston University to "reconsider" certain kinds of actions and decisions. See Agreement
§ E(2), at 16. However, the university retains the option of standing by its initial determinations
in all matters except that the Chelsea School Committee may override Boston University's
determinations (but only by a two-thirds majority) regarding the adoption of annual budgets,
collective bargaining agreements, and "educational policies affecting the school system as a
whole, including substantial revisions to the content or timetable for the implementation of the
educational program provided for by this agreement." Id. E, at 17. It would seem easy for
the university, if so minded, to frame its actions and determinations so as to avoid application
of the latter category strictly construed. Moreover, Boston University is a private corporation
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Chelsea residents stand to be substantially deprived for a period of
ten years (half of a Jeffersonian generation and five-sixths of a normal
journey from first grade through high school) of whatever personal
"rights" one may think they have to political2 self-government in a
realm of obvious high democratic significance.

03

Of course it would be foolish for aggrieved Chelsea residents or
other opponents of such cutbacks on democracy to regard judicial
action as their only or even primary line of resistance. It would seem
equally mindless of them to dismiss courts altogether from consideration. A strongly argued judicial invalidation of the Chelsea school
takeover, on the ground, say, that the takeover invidiously discriminates against Chelsea voters 2°4 by exceptionally infringing on their
fundamental interests in political self-government, could conceivably
pack a normative wallop beyond the confines of the Chelsea contro205
versy itself.

As it happens, the Supreme Court has never held that there is a
constitutionally "fundamental" interest simply in political self-government. 206 Every case reviewed in this article has been one involving a

claimed fundamental interest in "participat[ing] in elections on an
equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction '20 7 - an interest in
not being excluded from whatever electoral politics in fact go on around

not normally governed by Massachusetts administrative law pertaining to such niceties as open
meetings and access to public records, and the contract leaves that status mainly undisturbed.
See id. F, at 18-22.
203. See, e.g., A. GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 5-15, 36-41, 63-76 (1987). Insofar
as we do regard political self-government as a fundamental personal "right," we presumably
will not regard that right as properly relinquishable by the action of Chelsea's incumbent school
committee in authorizing the agreement, or by the committee's forbearance from time to time
to terminate the agreement, however representative that committee may be of majority sentiment in Chelsea. Cf. Lucas v. General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964) ("[a]n individual's
constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied . . . by a
vote of a majority of a State's electorate").
204. And thus denies them equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.
205. Identifying a "fundamental interest" capable of exacting "strict scrutiny" of the
takeover law might well be crucial to the argument. The legislative finding of a special educational
crisis in Chelsea, see 1989 MAss. ACTS ch. 133, § 2, might well satisfy rational-basis scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, the state would have to justify its failure to try less discriminatory
alternatives, such as increasing its funding or improving its supervisory and other policy support
for the Chelsea school district.
206. See generally Nahmod, Reflections on Appointive Local Government Bodies and a
Right to an Election, 11 DUQ. L. REV. 119 (1972) (discussing the constitutional arguments that
could be made to support the right to an elective as opposed to an appointive body).
207. San Antonio Unified School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 n.74 (1973) (quoting
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)) (emphasis added).
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one. Such an interest is not infringed by the Chelsea school arrangement.
The apparent distinction is that between intra- and inter-jurisdictional discrimination with respect to political enfranchisement. Intrajurisdictional discrimination gives rise to what we may call an "equal
footing" type of voting-equality claim. Inter-jurisdictional discrimination gives rise to what we may call a "right to politics" type of votingequality claim. Establishing the constitutional-legal fundamentality of
any sort of "right to politics," as distinguished from a right to an equal
footing in whatever politics there are in one's neighborhood, is work
that remains to be done. One way to go about that work is by extending
"fundamental" status, already accorded the equal-footing interest, to
the right-to-politics interest. That means persuading the relevant audience that the values underlying the fundamentality of the former
apply equally to the latter.
It does not take extended reflection to see that the more an audience
is gripped by visions of political activity as a strategic (as opposed to
deliberative) and instrumental (as opposed to self-constitutive) affair,
the more prone it will be to view equal-footing claims as quite different
from and much stronger than right-to-politics claims. Anyone advocating the unconstitutionality of the Chelsea school takeover therefore
would have reason to excavate and exhibit the traces - however
"ideological '20 5 - of dialogic political vision, and of its deliberativeethos and constitutive-value components, contained in the country's
constitutional "jurisprudence" to date. And so would any of the rest
of us in whose eyes the dialogic ideal is a progressive one.20 9

208.

See generally Mensch & Freeman, Hobbesian America, supra note 10.

209.

Cf. P. RICOUER, HERAIENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 99 (J. Thompson tr.

1981):
In the modern capitalist system ... the ancient Greek question of the 'good life'
is abolished in favor of the functioning of a manipulated system. The problems of
praxis linked to communication - in particular the desire to submit important
political questions to public discussion and democratic decision - have not disappeared; they persist, but in a repressed form .... [GIranted that ideology today
consists in disguising the difference between the normative order of communicative
action and bureaucratic conditioning. . . .how can the interest in emancipation
remain anything other than a pious vow, save by embodying it in the reawakening
of communicative action itself? And upon what will you concretely support the
reawakening of communicative action, if not upon the creative renewal of cultural
heritage?
Pace Mensch & Freeman, Hobbesian America, supra note 10, at 583 n.6, there is nothing in
the argument of E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988), to refute the "renewable" presence in the "cultural heritage"
of American constitutionalism of an ideal of self-government through democratic communicative
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The aim of the excavation is confrontation. The result of confrontation is unpredictable: it might be incomprehension, denial, or repudiation. Or it might be progress. If you ask me, the odds on progress
are not favorable. That, however, is not a reason for not trying if
there is nothing much to lose. And what is there to lose?

action. Among Morgan's chief, declared purposes in recounting the ideological (fictive, dramaturgical, opportunistic) aspects of the origins and content of the idea of the people self-governing
are those of questioning the distinction between (viable) political fiction and political truth, and
affirming ideology's utopian potential. Morgan undertakes to show how 'the fictional qualities
of popular sovereignty sustain rather than threaten the human values associated with it," and
how the fiction "has provided the leverage for political and social changes that have brought
our institutions into closer proximity" to 'the aspirations it fosters." Id. at 14-15, 38; see id. at
24-25, 37, 63, 90-91, 152, 230, 256, 306.
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